No, no - I don't think it's that simple. I just know practically nothing about biology. But it is a definite affect in the brain, no? The cluster of compounds which produce the affect "mildly irritating to the academic left." The affect associated with his particular brand of perversity.
Fascism!
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nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
On the basis that political extremism is difficult to sell to anyone these days, for one, and it would be extremely impractical/impossible/unrewarding to start some sort of grassroots academic movement that had no broader appeal.
The distinction seems obvious. Plato-cum-Socrates wasn't asking everyone to overthrow the Greek government of the time, but he was critical of nearly ever value/belief that was taken for granted by Greeks of the time.
PS - Do you mind if post a rewrite of the previous post? I added some more, but didn't want to cross wires. It follows below:
Zizek's milieu is the audience which constitutes itself around his ideas... I'm not talking about paramilitaries. I'm talking about the way in which that milieu comes to interact with other milieus, in the service of creating larger milieus. As it happens, I think the problem with Zizek's ideas is they are sterile, and non-productive of greater assemblages. The reason I think they are sterile, is because they instill an unwillingness to negotiate, producing instead dogmatic conviction. This, I feel, is unproductive. On a wider scale, I feel that a party constituted on a basis would be undesirable were they ever to take power. I am a skeptic. I want to retain a place for doubt.
"I think there is often a very clear distinction to be made between ideas people have and a political imperative to act on them in the most extreme manner possible."
But on what basis could such a distinction be drawn. And, once you have done so, what then becomes of the materiality of ideas? Extremity is a matter of intensity. The extremity of, say, going onto into the streets and killing for Zizek is only an intensity of a conviction which his work, in a modulated way, might be understood as also expressing itself in other surroundings, under other condition. The distinction between the man with the machete in his hand, the man with the pen in his, is not a distinction which could be drawn within the idea itself. Social circumstances create great intensities. But let's say that the basic appeal, the affective appeal, is to, for example, adrenaline. Is a politics of adrenaline really what we want?
Finally, let's say that it is an *essential* ethical safeguard to only read texts mildly. Zizek himself would dispute - he would say that you have to be serious. And I think he is right to do so, for the reasons he gives: because should you wish to do this,
Let me finally say that I have a very complicated relationship to Zizek especially, and also Badiou. I used to be a Zizekian, and much of my thinking has been in different ways formed by him. Some of it, probably, in ways that I don't even know. Just to give you some idea, I've read practically every book that he wrote, and at one time could do a pretty mean impression of him. I'm not saying this to imply that I have some authority over his interpretation - I definitely do not. It could be of course that I am entirely wrong, or at least misplaced, in my current views of his thought. But I mention this only to say that if I have failed to convey this in my rantings on him thus far, this is a definite failure of mine. I don't want you to think that I am implacably hostile to him, and think that he was be erased from the libraries of the world.
Indeed - I am being perfectly serious - in a sense my whole position is an intra-Zizek critique.
Zizek's milieu is the audience which constitutes itself around his ideas... I'm not talking about paramilitaries. I'm talking about the way in which that milieu comes to interact with other milieus, in the service of creating larger milieus. As it happens, I think the problem with Zizek's ideas is they are sterile, and non-productive of greater assemblages. The reason I think they are sterile, is because they instill an unwillingness to negotiate, producing instead dogmatic conviction. This, I feel, is unproductive. On a wider scale, I feel that a party constituted on a basis would be undesirable were they ever to take power. I am a skeptic. I want to retain a place for doubt.
"I think there is often a very clear distinction to be made between ideas people have and a political imperative to act on them in the most extreme manner possible."
But on what basis could such a distinction be drawn. And, once you have done so, what then becomes of the materiality of ideas? Extremity is a matter of intensity. The extremity of, say, going onto into the streets and killing for Zizek is only an intensity of a conviction which his work, in a modulated way, might be understood as also expressing itself in other surroundings, under other condition. The distinction between the man with the machete in his hand, the man with the pen in his, is not a distinction which could be drawn within the idea itself. Social circumstances create great intensities. But let's say that the basic appeal, the affective appeal, is to, for example, adrenaline. Is a politics of adrenaline really what we want?
Finally, let's say that it is an *essential* ethical safeguard to only read texts mildly. Zizek himself would dispute - he would say that you have to be serious. And I think he is right to do so, for the reasons he gives: because should you wish to do this,
Let me finally say that I have a very complicated relationship to Zizek especially, and also Badiou. I used to be a Zizekian, and much of my thinking has been in different ways formed by him. Some of it, probably, in ways that I don't even know. Just to give you some idea, I've read practically every book that he wrote, and at one time could do a pretty mean impression of him. I'm not saying this to imply that I have some authority over his interpretation - I definitely do not. It could be of course that I am entirely wrong, or at least misplaced, in my current views of his thought. But I mention this only to say that if I have failed to convey this in my rantings on him thus far, this is a definite failure of mine. I don't want you to think that I am implacably hostile to him, and think that he was be erased from the libraries of the world.
Indeed - I am being perfectly serious - in a sense my whole position is an intra-Zizek critique.
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Adrenaline is produced by adrenal glands when a "fear" (flight-or-fight) response is triggered in the limbic system. It enables people to achieve physical feats that they might not otherwise be able to achieve so they can avoid death/predators/injury.
There is an effect in the brain that reading anything that chimes with one's own intellectual/personal beliefs or ideas has, but adrenaline production is not it.
It would most likely speed up/increase dopamine and serotonin production and possibly reuptake inhibition. Feel good chemicals. Chemicals that would lead someone to, say, write a blog post and hope others read it and responded.
The same reason why people eat chocolate. But eating chocolate has the added benefit of flavonoids, anti-carcinogenic antioxidants. Reading Zizek has the added benefit of raising political awareness, and agitating a deeper critical response to the world around you.
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nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Taking something seriously (and I agree, we should take Zizek seriously) in an intellectual way--ruminating, chewing on it for a while, possibly spitting it out, maybe digesting it--does not require a person to commit their lives to carrying out this thing politically, or in the world political arena, in as literal a sense possible.
A question, then: Does Zizek have more than an intellectual appeal, on the basis you've given.
PS - Please discount the adrenaline. The point of that ill-chosen example was simply to suggest that he adduces, like all media, a chemical response. Which you seem to agree with. My question is: To what extent is it seperable from his political content? I think it is not seperable.
This argument is getting very complex.
PS - Please discount the adrenaline. The point of that ill-chosen example was simply to suggest that he adduces, like all media, a chemical response. Which you seem to agree with. My question is: To what extent is it seperable from his political content? I think it is not seperable.
This argument is getting very complex.
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nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
This one touches on a lot of the topics we've bumped up against in this thread.
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Ok.
So? Is this supposed to be a particularly bad passage or something?
All critics believe critics need to serve this sort of "external" function. If you'll note, however, Zizek never says that he is the only one who does this, nor does he say that his ideas are the only ones that will save the world from capitalism.
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
Of what? Writing of polemical pieces about Marxism?
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
In a mathematical/formal (logical) sense, a statement can't be both true and not true. So the truth is one-sided, if you can get to it. That's the hard part.
But I do agree that taking a stand, not being afraid to claim that the truth is universal, is something that people can't or won't do anymore. And I can definitely see why someone would consider this a problem, or at very least an effect of neo-liberal ideology's successful perpetration on the masses via the capitalist apparatus. (moral relativism)
But I do agree that taking a stand, not being afraid to claim that the truth is universal, is something that people can't or won't do anymore. And I can definitely see why someone would consider this a problem, or at very least an effect of neo-liberal ideology's successful perpetration on the masses via the capitalist apparatus. (moral relativism)
vimothy
yurp
Well, I believe that has already happened.
I was thinking of the title of the thread.
Interesting the way he moves through the section "Of Apes and Men"
He identifies THE two philosophers of contemporary moment, and then proceeds to formalize a position from them based on this assignation. This interpretation then serves as the basis for a general critique of the contemporary moment, which proceeds by first conjuring a specter of global catastrophe, from an unnamed Hollywood movie. He then produces an anecdote from a survival manual, and deduces an irony from it. This irony then serves as a lever to score a shot on the delusions of standard-pragmatic utilitarian criticism. He then claims that the controversy of Singer's position resides in the fact that he has revealed the truth to us of our own ethical moment. He then quotes Hegel in support. He then follows the line of his own interpretation. He then says that it contradicts with this quote from Hegel. He then moves from Hegel to Lenin. He then capitalizes the words Universal, Partisan, and Criteria, arguing that partisan universalists must assert the right to decide the criteria for these narratives. He then says that an item of wisdom from Lenin's own life is identifiable as an emergence of truth. He then describes a peculiar incident in which he was accused of being a holocaust denier. He then says that we should discuss the holocaust more openly.
I am not sure what exactly this means. Individual parts of it seem plausible, but I don't see how they hang together logically. Is this extremely naive?
He identifies THE two philosophers of contemporary moment, and then proceeds to formalize a position from them based on this assignation. This interpretation then serves as the basis for a general critique of the contemporary moment, which proceeds by first conjuring a specter of global catastrophe, from an unnamed Hollywood movie. He then produces an anecdote from a survival manual, and deduces an irony from it. This irony then serves as a lever to score a shot on the delusions of standard-pragmatic utilitarian criticism. He then claims that the controversy of Singer's position resides in the fact that he has revealed the truth to us of our own ethical moment. He then quotes Hegel in support. He then follows the line of his own interpretation. He then says that it contradicts with this quote from Hegel. He then moves from Hegel to Lenin. He then capitalizes the words Universal, Partisan, and Criteria, arguing that partisan universalists must assert the right to decide the criteria for these narratives. He then says that an item of wisdom from Lenin's own life is identifiable as an emergence of truth. He then describes a peculiar incident in which he was accused of being a holocaust denier. He then says that we should discuss the holocaust more openly.
I am not sure what exactly this means. Individual parts of it seem plausible, but I don't see how they hang together logically. Is this extremely naive?
vimothy
yurp
But what is this truth -- "Lenin's legacy"?
nomadthethird
more issues than Time mag
If Zizek is such a great fascist, so capable of politically mobilizing everyone in the greater service of Leninism, why did Zizek lose and lose badly in the Republic of Slovenia general election in which he ran for president?
Where are all these mobilized Zizekian fascists? Where do they live? What kind of power do they actually have?
This question just seems entirely preposterous on the face of it.
Vimothy - this is a very good question. Zizek specifies it across several registers. This is his mediological specification:
"it is the signifier “Lenin” which FORMALIZES this content found elsewhere, transforming a series of common notions into a truly subversive theoretical formation."
To which we should perhaps ask the Leninist question: subversive to whom? We can surely agree that Zizek mobilizes a form of subversion from norms. But what is the nature of this subversion? To call it fascist is probably misleading.