War In Iran

luka

Well-known member
Mr Craner, the Kraner vs Kraner reference (even to ignore the evident film one) was a simple reinforcement of the point being made about your irrational, self-refuting posts: that you are seemingly oblivious to the war raging inside your contradictory, smugonautic head, you lonely waif.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
This article contains a potted history of the Dissensus politics forum:

If Iran is peaceful and genuinely desirous of rapprochement with the West, according to Hersh, Washington is hell-bent on bombing it. Indeed, his article last June exculpating Tehran of utilizing nuclear technology for nefarious purposes was merely the culmination of a years-long series of stories claiming that President George W. Bush was preparing for war against Iran.

In no fewer than six feature-length New Yorker articles published during the Bush administration, Hersh claimed that the United States was going to launch a war against the Islamic Republic. The first such article appeared more than seven years ago. In “The Coming Wars,” published in January 2005, Hersh wrote: “In my interviews, I was repeatedly told that the next strategic target was Iran.” He quoted a “former high-level intelligence official” who said: “Next, we’re going to have the Iranian campaign.” In April 2006, Hersh alleged that the Bush administration “increased clandestine activities inside Iran and intensified planning for a possible major air attack.” That piece made the stunning charge that the U.S. was contemplating a tactical nuclear first strike against Iran. Three months later, in an article entitled “Last Stand,” Hersh relayed the tale of how “senior commanders” in the military were heroically challenging Bush’s order that they prepare for a “major bombing campaign in Iran.”

In November 2006, after the midterm elections restored Democratic control of Congress, Hersh reported that the administration had decided to refocus its plans for an attack on Iran by throwing support to a Kurdish terrorist organization rather than prepare for an extensive bombing run. In March 2007, the “realists” within the administration must have weakened, because Hersh wrote that Bush had ordered a list of Iranian targets to be bombed, a decision that “brought the United States closer to an open confrontation with Iran.” An attack could come as early as “this spring,” Hersh wrote, according to one of his innumerable “former senior intelligence officials.” When spring came and went, with no attack on Iran, Hersh returned with a piece in October, alleging now that “the emphasis is on ‘surgical’ strikes on Revolutionary Guard facilities in Tehran and elsewhere, which, the Administration claims, have been the source of attacks on Americans in Iraq.”

Needless to say, the United States never went to war against Iran during the Bush administration. And there is no evidence that the administration had ever prepared for a war—certainly less evidence than exists for the suspicion that Iran is working towards the ability to produce a nuclear weapon, which Hersh loudly warns anyone and everyone from concluding. Indeed, according to a 2009 report in the New York Times, President Bush rejected a request from Israel the previous year that it be allowed to attack Iran’s main nuclear facility, which would have required flying over Iraqi airspace. That Hersh’s reporting on Iran has repeatedly been exposed as inaccurate never once dissuaded him from repeating his same fantastical assertions over and over again.

Good times.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
I can't be bothered to read it, actually, so could you summarise why militrary action against Iran would have worse consequences than a nuclear-armed Iran?
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
The thing I don't understand is this fear that once Iran has nukes, or even a nuke, it'll metamorphose into some kind of regional superpower and have people quaking in their boots from Tel Aviv to Mumbai. So let's suppose Iran manages to build a couple of small, primitive nukes: what's it gonna do? lob them at Israel, which has hundreds of thermonuclear warheads and modern ICBMs with which to deploy them? Ahmedinejad and the Guardian Council may not be the most well-balanced regime on the planet but I don't think they're suicidal. And who else are they gonna menace: Saudi Arabia, a valuable US ally and trading partner? India, which has had a nuclear arsenal since the 70s? Pakistan, also an established nuclear power and (nominally, at least) a US ally? Turkey, a card-carrying NATO member? Iraq or Afghanistan, which America might have something to say about?

The most plausible explanation I've heard is that Iran is aiming for "nuclear ambiguity", or the state of affairs whereby it's clear that the country has the capacity to create weapons but there's no actual evidence that they've done so. Which does at least argue that, if there is indeed a weapons programme, it's being conducted with defence in mind (I mean actual defence, not "defence" in the sense of a euphemism for "war").
 
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padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
@craner - just off the top of my head:

1) israel doesn't have the capacity to knock out iran's nuclear program w/o a massive, sustained bombing campaign (+ maybe not even then). it's not like osirak.
2) iran already has large chemical + biological weapon stockpiles
3) it's completely against the regime's interests to use a nuke on anyone, let alone israel
4) the regime has severe internal problems (dissidents, terrible economy, huge heroin problem, balochi/kurd/etc unrest). an attack will rally iranis behind the regime.
5) corollary to #4: an attack would likely unify the mullahs + the RGC in the face of an external threat
6) iran has in serious influence in syria. cutting that off would be a much better way of curtailing its regional power (+ it's channels to hizballah + hamas)
7) bombing would be a global pr disaster for israel + the u.s. not that netanyahu etc care but obama has spent a lot time trying to restore our international rep
8) (very successfully) assassinating scientists is much more efficient than bombing (not that I'm personally for assassinations, just stating that)
 

crackerjack

Well-known member
Ahmedinejad and the Guardian Council may not be the most well-balanced regime on the planet but I don't think they're suicidal.

But that's exactly the case being made against them, at least on the Mad Mel/blogger wing of the argument. These people aren't rational, they're like they the American Rapturists and would welcome the end of the world etc. You and I might think they're preoccupied, like most dictators, with maintaining their own power more than obliterating the planet, but just look at those crazy beards! Can't you see what you're dealing with?

And who else are they gonna menace: that staunch US ally, Saudi Arabia?

Actually not such a strethch. Nukes, even unused ones, count as leverage and Saudi's oil region is majority Shia, as is Bahrain.
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
But that's exactly the case being made against them, at least on the Mad Mel/blogger wing of the argument. These people aren't rational, they're like they the American Rapturists and would welcome the end of the world etc. You and I might think they're preoccupied, like most dictators, with maintaining their own power more than obliterating the planet, but just look at those crazy beards! Can't you see what you're dealing with?

Yeah, well to the sort of person who likes their enemies clear-cut and well defined, I'm sure every Islamist faction on the planet, from the Taliban to Hezbollah to Boko Haram to a handful of angry young misfits in Bradford, is part of a single undifferentiated conspiracy of fanatical jihadist loonies who - as you say - want to take over if not destroy the world for the sheer hell of it.

kdong said:
Actually not such a strethch. Nukes, even unused ones, count as leverage and Saudi's oil region is majority Shia, as is Bahrain.

I guess it's six of one, half a dozen of the other. Surely pre-emptive use against any target remotely valuable to American interests would invite instant fiery megadeath upon Iran, hence the suggestion that they want the possibility that they have the bomb as a purely defensive measure. But yeah, even the possibility would ultimately increase Iran's clout in the region, especially since it's well known they have medium-range, nuke-ready missiles.
 

crackerjack

Well-known member
I guess it's six of one, half a dozen of the other. Surely pre-emptive use against any target remotely valuable to American interests would invite instant fiery megadeath upon Iran

But the US has no emotional attachment to the house of Saud, only the oil that it controls. Obviously they wouldn't abandon it tomorrow, but so long as any future Saudi regime could be counted on to keep selling oil westwards, you can't see the US dying in the last ditch for the Saudi regime the way they would for Israel.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
1) israel doesn't have the capacity to knock out iran's nuclear program w/o a massive, sustained bombing campaign (+ maybe not even then). it's not like osirak.
2) iran already has large chemical + biological weapon stockpiles
3) it's completely against the regime's interests to use a nuke on anyone, let alone israel
4) the regime has severe internal problems (dissidents, terrible economy, huge heroin problem, balochi/kurd/etc unrest). an attack will rally iranis behind the regime.
5) corollary to #4: an attack would likely unify the mullahs + the RGC in the face of an external threat
6) iran has in serious influence in syria. cutting that off would be a much better way of curtailing its regional power (+ it's channels to hizballah + hamas)
7) bombing would be a global pr disaster for israel + the u.s. not that netanyahu etc care but obama has spent a lot time trying to restore our international rep
8) (very successfully) assassinating scientists is much more efficient than bombing (not that I'm personally for assassinations, just stating that)

Are you summarising the article or are these your own thoughts?

Here's what I think: No. 1 is true, as is No 2, I suspect; No. 3 is partly true, but we are talking about the regional balance of power, which is very much in the regime's interests; No. 4 is half true, but I think the second proposition is an assumption that is open to challenge as is No. 5, although they cause plenty of mischief united or not; No. 6 is about to be terminally ruptured anyway, by the people of Syria; No. 7, PR, yeah, whatever; No. 8 is also true, but is war by other means, anyway.

I take the exact opposite attitude to Tea's rather blase pose. The Iranian regime is aggressive. When it has a nuclear weapons capability the regional balance of power will be theirs. Countering the regime's aggression will be almost impossible, without dicing with destruction. It would spark a regional arms race (it already has: the Saudis and Turks have their own briskly advancing nuclear weapons programmes, although for some reason we never hear about that). There is also the WMD/terrorism nexus, which is considered something of a joke these days -- mistake. I've been arguing since about 2005 that this is less about Israel than it looks, or is sold as. The French and Russians should be just as worried about how it will affect their own regional interests -- for example, when they have free reign in Lebanon, or start causing havoc among the Azeris. All of the other Middle Eastern regimes, with the exception of the Syrians, are terrified of a nuclear Iran. They would rather see them bombed. They say this in private with some emphasis, as Wikileaks disclosed.
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
I'm not being blase, I'm just trying to be realistic about what you can and can't do when you have a small, rudimentary nuclear arsenal and there are at least six, possibly eight, countries that could squash you like a bug in five minutes flat if they so chose.

I repeat my point that a plausible nuclear capability for Iran makes much more sense as a defensive measure than as a means to increase aggressive capabilities in the region. Suppose Iran decided to invade one of its neighbours; how would a nuclear arsenal make that any easier? The Tehran regime would know that any first use in the region would be suicide-by-Israel, surely? Even if Iran's would-be invadee were some Arab state that Israel couldn't care less about, don't you think the Israelis would be freaked out enough to destroy Iran's capability before it got turned in their direction?
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
@craner - my own thoughts. not necessarily 100% committed to all those points, but to expand a bit:

Iran's internal issues are a serious consideration. if you're israel/u.s. (or those other m.e. regimes) is working to destabilize the regime (from within + without) a better risk/reward than bombing? seems like it to me. if you're serious about the military option you're talking about a war, not a raid. there is no way in hell U.S. is getting into another long-term military occupation, no one else will do it, so at best you're looking at a Gulf War I scenario where you leave the regime intact to immediately go back to its nuclear program. also, what if Iran shuts down the Strait of Hormuz?

not at all certain that Iran's influence in Syria (the channel to its proxies) will wane post-Assad. in fact it might increase in the resulting power vacuum.

PR is maybe the wrong word. Arab regimes have a long history of saying one thing privately + doing another publicly, pulled along by the popular rage of their people. especially now when autocrats are watching their counterparts topple like dominoes. also, Turkey. Erdogan + co. are already walking a very thin, precarious line (there's an essay in this month's New Yorker about this).

"regional balance of power" is nebulous + overrated.
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
geopolitics aside it really boils down to two purely pragmatic points

-the lack of military capacity to actually do it
-the impossibility of containing nuclear technology in general

you're only delaying the inevitable. + not delaying it for very long either.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
I'll just quickly defend a few points, then.

Mr Tea, nuclear arms as a defensive measure is also clearly offensive in Iran's case, as it gives them cover to carry on (and extend) actions they are currently egnaged in, regionally and globally. Nobody is seriously expecting Iran to bomb Israel or invade Saudi Arabia. But Iran is currently destablising Saudia Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories, to name the most obvious examples, through proxies; there is also the worry that many of their proxies are militant movements with revolutionary ideologies.

Padraig is backing up my contention that America is not, and never has been, considering a war on Iran; I'm sure that parts of the Pentagon are planning first-strike scenarios, but that's a very different thing. Most Pentagon plans simply collect dust or attract merely academic interest.

I definitely think Iran's influence in Syria will wane once the Assads are gone, unless they acheive a direct proxy coup. Syria under the Assad dynasty has been a powerful state ally, cultivated over decades. The loss is already a hard blow for Tehran, I think. They spent a lot of treasure in the last year defending the Assads.

Regional balance of power is neither nebulous or over-rated, in this case; a nuclear Iran would be as aggressive as it is now, and almost untouchable. It would also be unstable, as fragile and fissile as Pakistan.

I don't think any of this is unrealistic.
 

craner

Beast of Burden
The other thing I wanted to say, while I'm here, and because some of you always presume otherwise, I personally wouldn't advocate a military strike on Iran from any quarter. I would love to see the regime go, but regime change will come from within (eventually). America just needs to keep the pressure on and give the opposition active assistance where possible, where needed, and when solicited. Most of the Middle East countries are now acting as if the Iranians have the Bomb already, so some of the worst consquences are in play anyway. But it's essentially a secondary issue. The US ought to pay closer attention to what the IRGC is getting up to in Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba. Regime change and terrorism -- these are the main things.
 

Mr. Tea

Let's Talk About Ceps
I would love to see the regime go, but regime change will come from within (eventually). America just needs to keep the pressure on and give the opposition active assistance where possible, where needed, and when solicited.

I think "when solicited" is key here. Otherwise it runs the risk of delegitimizing the opposition and making the whole thing look like 1953 all over again. I mean, to what extent does the Mousavi faction actually want US assistance?
 
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