Tentative Andy
I'm in the Meal Deal
People are being very reasonable and understanding in their responses here, I must say. Thanks. What cobretti and shiels said struck a particular cord.
Holding everything together in your head
- Thread starter Tentative Andy
- Start date
blackpixie
Well-known member
it happens all the time. In virtually everything my self does I wonder my motives. Especially analyzing them psychoanalytically. But then I get all pissed off because of how selfish that seems. It feels as if I am only concerned with the cleanliness of my conscious. Then disappointment sets in because, turns out I am not a "good person" afterall. Then it just becomes a self indulgent feel sorry for myself party, its a vicious cycle.
So half the time I am trying to do something good I end up not counting it because it feels like i am slaving for some sort of inherent, freud defined, psychologically selfish desire.
I would say something like that is what keeps me from achieving a state of Nirvana...
well that and coffee/caffeine
So half the time I am trying to do something good I end up not counting it because it feels like i am slaving for some sort of inherent, freud defined, psychologically selfish desire.
I would say something like that is what keeps me from achieving a state of Nirvana...
well that and coffee/caffeine
Unless your selfishness is so extreme that it completely outrules a desire to contribute to any good other than your own, I wouldn't worry too much about a mild selfishness. To take too hard a utilitarian stance and how you should act in order to be a virtuous person will likely end up too demanding of a framework: it is only natural that you have a duty to your own happiness before anybody else's. Within limits of course, but particularly if in attending to your happiness you are not infringing upon anybody else's.
Guilt is a nasty and destructive thing when it is applied to too stringent a moral code. A little moral calculus would probably sort you right out.
Also the part of psychological egoism that suggests that you are doing good things out of a selfish desire to appear a certain way, or to satisfy your own selfish desire to be a virtuous person, falls apart when you consider that even having a desire to do the right thing presupposes a genuine concern for the welfare of others regardless of effect.
There is this story I think of Abraham Lincoln stopping a train to help a pig rescue her piglets from drowning in mud. The others on the train commended him, but he said that it wasn't really selfless because in not doing so he'd never have been able to continue his day happily. This is an argument for psychological egoism, but what he isn't realizing is that in even understanding that his happiness would be caused by the welfare of the pigs suggests a genuine concern, and therefore a genuine virtue.
Morality is a strange thing. Viewed in a certain way, it can make the most virtuous people hate themselves and definitely lead to not holding everything together in your head.
There is this story I think of Abraham Lincoln stopping a train to help a pig rescue her piglets from drowning in mud. The others on the train commended him, but he said that it wasn't really selfless because in not doing so he'd never have been able to continue his day happily. This is an argument for psychological egoism, but what he isn't realizing is that in even understanding that his happiness would be caused by the welfare of the pigs suggests a genuine concern, and therefore a genuine virtue.
Morality is a strange thing. Viewed in a certain way, it can make the most virtuous people hate themselves and definitely lead to not holding everything together in your head.
Mr. Tea
Let's Talk About Ceps
AKA the impossibility of true altruism. Which is a reasonable argument as far as it goes, but as you say, a real arsehole would have thought "So some pigs died - so what?" and forgotten about it straight away.
Though AFAIK Lincoln wasn't a vegetarian, so he probably contributed to the deaths of plenty of pigs and other animals over the course of his life. But then no-one ever said compassion was a wholly rational emotion...
Last edited:
blackpixie
Well-known member
It seems like wanting to do a "good thing" for the "right reasons" is like having your cake and eating it too.
Thats what leads me to believe that morality is some twisted thing that we will never understand in the same way we cannot observe the 54th dimension.
Its why i like music so much, and more specifically why i have gotten so into hip hop over the last few years.
Thats what leads me to believe that morality is some twisted thing that we will never understand in the same way we cannot observe the 54th dimension.
Its why i like music so much, and more specifically why i have gotten so into hip hop over the last few years.
mixed_biscuits
_________________________
Lincoln felt pleased because previous, often personally arduous, morally virtuous acts of his (by which he has come to empathise with others) had changed his dispositions, making him more likely to act virtuously in the future - the moral 'work' had already been done.
Provided that one's acts are morally virtuous, the stronger the feelings of pleasure, the more likely one is disposed to be virtuous, the more likely one has made difficult decisions in the past to shape one's dispositions rightly.
I would rather know a happy altruist (one whose dispositions have been oriented rightly) than an unhappy one (one whose dispositions are in the process of being re-oriented).
The happy altruist has always been, previously, an unhappy one, who once worked to orient their dispositions. (This assumes that one isn't disposed from birth to act altruistically.)
The greater the proportion of morally virtuous acts one performs, the easier it becomes to perform them.
The unfeeling altruist can only have acted randomly.
Provided that one's acts are morally virtuous, the stronger the feelings of pleasure, the more likely one is disposed to be virtuous, the more likely one has made difficult decisions in the past to shape one's dispositions rightly.
I would rather know a happy altruist (one whose dispositions have been oriented rightly) than an unhappy one (one whose dispositions are in the process of being re-oriented).
The happy altruist has always been, previously, an unhappy one, who once worked to orient their dispositions. (This assumes that one isn't disposed from birth to act altruistically.)
The greater the proportion of morally virtuous acts one performs, the easier it becomes to perform them.
The unfeeling altruist can only have acted randomly.
Last edited:
This is a strange argument and probably, if pursued, more suitable for another thread, but it would appear that this whole argument hinges on morally virtuous acts (whether you intend those deemed so by the agent or those objectively discovered, or both, I'm not sure) being contingent on the pleasure caused in the agent by doing them. Obviously you are making a distinction between a morally virtuous act and a morally virtuous person, and are saying that it is not enough for a person to simply act virtuously to call himself virtuous.
I'm not quite sure where I stand on this yet, as there are good arguments for both sides, but I don't at first think that the problem is solved by observing whether or not the agent enjoyed carrying out the action.
I feel like it does not consider the importance of intentionality. If I intended the happiness of another person when acting, even if I didn't enjoy the means to accomplishing that goal, I feel most would think I acted more virtuously for undergoing these pains in order to bring about that effect. On the other hand, if I did something that benefited you, enjoying it immensely, but without intending your happiness, it occurring as an unplanned side effect to my enjoyment, it would seem that this would be acting randomly and less altruistically.
Basically, if I intended your happiness, especially over my own, there is no doubt I acted altruistically since this was my intention, and because it was intended it could not have been random. My enjoyment of the means employed in creating that effect is only an added benefit for me; the real virtue lies in the end, the satisfaction of my desire for you to be happy.
But yeah, I really don't mean to derail this thread if that is the case.
Last edited:
mixed_biscuits
_________________________
I think my writing was a little garbled in the post; I still hadn't really worked out how best to phrase what I was thinking, and it will become evident that is still to be the case!
My argument was primarily aimed at doing away with the worry that if you are enjoying an act, then somehow it becomes by definition self-centred, not altruistic. 'My' central idea was that the enjoyment that you get from doing something comes from having followed one's inclinations, which themselves are local manifestations of one's dispositions, and that if one gradually forms one's dispositions according to the shape of morally virtuous behaviour, one will reach a point at which it becomes unrealistic to expect still to experience or even to be able to experience some moral choices as being arduous.
The feeling of pleasure comes only from being able to indulge one's dispositions, and so cannot be taken as a sign that one has acted morally; immoral acts give as much pleasure as moral ones, provided that they issue out of one's dispositions. My theory is symmetrical in this way.
What an absence of pleasure might indicate is that someone has acted against their general disposition - perhaps as when one acts to the benefit of another without any hope of a personal pay-off.
However, as one begins to make an increasing number of these virtuous acts, it becomes easier to make them, and one finds that feelings of pleasure replace the arduous deliberation that may originally have accompanied them. These feelings of pleasure reflect *only* that one has acted in line with one's inclinations.
One's willingness to act against one's dispositions might be an indication of how altruistic or moral one is, but, provided that one continues to act in generally the same direction (be it morally or immorally (assuming that both have an intrinsic consistency, perhaps the former being 'other-directed', the latter 'self-directed'), there will come a point at which the moral behaviour has become firmly inculcated and there will be fewer opportunities to act morally against one's inclinations - in effect, one would have collected as many selflessness brownie points as could be collected. At this point, one could well be acting as morally virtuously as is possible and be as happy as is possible, as the ought of one's behaviour would be identical to the is.
The rightness of this theory might find confirmation in the spectacle of self-flagellating holy men, desperately trying to recreate the feelings of difficulty that accompanied their dispositional training, before their virtuous acts became habit.
My argument was primarily aimed at doing away with the worry that if you are enjoying an act, then somehow it becomes by definition self-centred, not altruistic. 'My' central idea was that the enjoyment that you get from doing something comes from having followed one's inclinations, which themselves are local manifestations of one's dispositions, and that if one gradually forms one's dispositions according to the shape of morally virtuous behaviour, one will reach a point at which it becomes unrealistic to expect still to experience or even to be able to experience some moral choices as being arduous.
The feeling of pleasure comes only from being able to indulge one's dispositions, and so cannot be taken as a sign that one has acted morally; immoral acts give as much pleasure as moral ones, provided that they issue out of one's dispositions. My theory is symmetrical in this way.
What an absence of pleasure might indicate is that someone has acted against their general disposition - perhaps as when one acts to the benefit of another without any hope of a personal pay-off.
However, as one begins to make an increasing number of these virtuous acts, it becomes easier to make them, and one finds that feelings of pleasure replace the arduous deliberation that may originally have accompanied them. These feelings of pleasure reflect *only* that one has acted in line with one's inclinations.
One's willingness to act against one's dispositions might be an indication of how altruistic or moral one is, but, provided that one continues to act in generally the same direction (be it morally or immorally (assuming that both have an intrinsic consistency, perhaps the former being 'other-directed', the latter 'self-directed'), there will come a point at which the moral behaviour has become firmly inculcated and there will be fewer opportunities to act morally against one's inclinations - in effect, one would have collected as many selflessness brownie points as could be collected. At this point, one could well be acting as morally virtuously as is possible and be as happy as is possible, as the ought of one's behaviour would be identical to the is.
The rightness of this theory might find confirmation in the spectacle of self-flagellating holy men, desperately trying to recreate the feelings of difficulty that accompanied their dispositional training, before their virtuous acts became habit.
blackpixie
Well-known member
Wow, good post biscuit
I agree! ha
I agree! ha
lanugo
von Verfall erzittern
mixed_biscuits, no offense, but your theory on the nature of altruism is just preposterous. It fails to recognise the central idea of morality so entirely that I wonder whether anyone but an autistic person or a total cynic could have come up with a warped concept like that. It's hard to even begin to point out all the implausible aspects and inconsistencies in your proposition but, seeing that people actually agree with you, I can't allow this nonsense to stand uncorrected.
The contentious point in the discussion was whether the apparent pleasure of commiting a morally virtuous act implicates that this very act, because of the joy it brings, is in fact a selfish one. Sick boy rightly pointed out that the capacity for enjoying this kind of ethically desirable action reveals a certain personal disposition towards morally-oriented behaviour and is therefore to be seen as the effect, not the cause of an individual's morality. You seem to agree with his. But at the same time you assume that some people, for whom moral choices are "arduous", in an act of volition, overcome their selfish impulses and do the right thing. According to you, this willful effort to act morally virtuous is, somehow, rewarded with "pleasure". Eventually, over the course of one's life, these feelings of pleasure will become so powerful that they outweigh one's initial tendency towards egoistical behaviour. In the end, you say, one is so habituated to the warm fuzzies of righteousness that, faced with a moral predicament, there is not even a chance of acting like a despicable person because doing the right thing just feels so damn good. You're suggesting that altruism, in effect, is some kind of moral masturbation, a mere result of life-long self-conditioning.
The major misunderstanding of your reasoning is to assume that the pleasurable side-effect of altruistic actions, i.e. a good conscience, is desired by absolutely everybody, even those individuals who are normally inclined to act only to their benefit. According to you, altruistic behaviour is indeed determined by a certain innate disposition, but at the same time you presume that the satisfying feeling of acting morally virtuous can be achieved by all invididuals, as if it were a basic physical gratification much like an orgasm. Hence, you say, this very sensation must be the primary and general motive for altruistic behaviour. The same way one can lead a life in pursuit of other pleasures, e.g. frequent sex or luxury, "one gradually forms one's positions according to the shape of morally virtuous behaviour", as you put it. This idea is completely flawed. Think about it - how important is a good conscience to most people? Do we not live in a world where selflishness, ruthlessness, corruption and mendacity are the order of the day? Our economic system is based upon mutual exploitation, politics is just a more or less disguised struggle for power, and in everday life people will treat each other like shit. This is not a pessimistic, but simply an accurate view of humanity. The reality of human life is not suitable for an, if you will, altruistic lifestyle. No individual develops a sense of integrity in the way you described it; when faced with a moral choice, people will naturally take advantage of the situation, but never will they surrender immediate benefits for the negligible sensation of a good conscience. So, the exact opposite of what you're saying is the case: On top of their natural, almost endless egoism, human beings are conditioned by experience to act even more selfishly. And are you really saying that a person struggling for uprightness will reach a point at which a moral choice ceases to be troublesome altogether? That's ludicrous! In what parallel universe do you live?! The longer one has tried to live as a good person, the more shit one has taken from others, the harder, if not impossible, it becomes for oneself to maintain a moral code, it begins to seem absurd or even self-destructive. You finally realize that in order to survive you may have to become like all the others, the ones you have always despised.
Still selflessness and morality exist. How? What is the basis of these virtues? Well, it is obvious, but still you completely disregard this fundamental aspect of altruism: compassion. The motivation of every morally virtuous act is to prevent the suffering of others, the good conscience that accompanies such deeds is secondary (and very often does not effectively compensate for the disadvantages the compassionate person accepts in order to alleviate the pain of others). Altruistic behaviour is spontaneous. Think for example of someone drowning, screaming for help. Some will immediately feel the urge to help, jump into the floods and risk their own life in order to save the person. Most people, however, will do nothing or merely call for help while watching the person go down. And, admittedly, in no way it is condemnable not to risk one's life for a stranger. But a few, very few individuals will, spontaneously, do everything to save another human being's life. This kind of selflessness is the most beautiful thing in the world. It has nothing to do with the expectancy of a pleasurable feeling in the aftermath, as you describe it, it is diametrically opposed to that - all that counts is the well-being of another, in the most extreme scenario the altruistic person will try to achieve this at the expense of his own life. For Schopenhauer compassion is the "primal phenomenon of ethics", an empirically ascertainable characteristic of human beings that, in effect, permeates every concept of morality that we have. In so far, compassion is the very foundation of morality but what is the cause of being compassionate in the first place? According to Schopenhauer, this is a metaphysical question as it requires to interpret this particular aspect of human existence in regard to what it actually means. Personally, I find Schopenhauer's answer - compassion is an expression of overcoming individuation, of tearing down the wall between "I" and "You" and recognising the oneness and holiness of every being - more convincing than the gene-related evolutionary explanations offered (so far) for the occurrence of altruistic behaviour.
The contentious point in the discussion was whether the apparent pleasure of commiting a morally virtuous act implicates that this very act, because of the joy it brings, is in fact a selfish one. Sick boy rightly pointed out that the capacity for enjoying this kind of ethically desirable action reveals a certain personal disposition towards morally-oriented behaviour and is therefore to be seen as the effect, not the cause of an individual's morality. You seem to agree with his. But at the same time you assume that some people, for whom moral choices are "arduous", in an act of volition, overcome their selfish impulses and do the right thing. According to you, this willful effort to act morally virtuous is, somehow, rewarded with "pleasure". Eventually, over the course of one's life, these feelings of pleasure will become so powerful that they outweigh one's initial tendency towards egoistical behaviour. In the end, you say, one is so habituated to the warm fuzzies of righteousness that, faced with a moral predicament, there is not even a chance of acting like a despicable person because doing the right thing just feels so damn good. You're suggesting that altruism, in effect, is some kind of moral masturbation, a mere result of life-long self-conditioning.
The major misunderstanding of your reasoning is to assume that the pleasurable side-effect of altruistic actions, i.e. a good conscience, is desired by absolutely everybody, even those individuals who are normally inclined to act only to their benefit. According to you, altruistic behaviour is indeed determined by a certain innate disposition, but at the same time you presume that the satisfying feeling of acting morally virtuous can be achieved by all invididuals, as if it were a basic physical gratification much like an orgasm. Hence, you say, this very sensation must be the primary and general motive for altruistic behaviour. The same way one can lead a life in pursuit of other pleasures, e.g. frequent sex or luxury, "one gradually forms one's positions according to the shape of morally virtuous behaviour", as you put it. This idea is completely flawed. Think about it - how important is a good conscience to most people? Do we not live in a world where selflishness, ruthlessness, corruption and mendacity are the order of the day? Our economic system is based upon mutual exploitation, politics is just a more or less disguised struggle for power, and in everday life people will treat each other like shit. This is not a pessimistic, but simply an accurate view of humanity. The reality of human life is not suitable for an, if you will, altruistic lifestyle. No individual develops a sense of integrity in the way you described it; when faced with a moral choice, people will naturally take advantage of the situation, but never will they surrender immediate benefits for the negligible sensation of a good conscience. So, the exact opposite of what you're saying is the case: On top of their natural, almost endless egoism, human beings are conditioned by experience to act even more selfishly. And are you really saying that a person struggling for uprightness will reach a point at which a moral choice ceases to be troublesome altogether? That's ludicrous! In what parallel universe do you live?! The longer one has tried to live as a good person, the more shit one has taken from others, the harder, if not impossible, it becomes for oneself to maintain a moral code, it begins to seem absurd or even self-destructive. You finally realize that in order to survive you may have to become like all the others, the ones you have always despised.
Still selflessness and morality exist. How? What is the basis of these virtues? Well, it is obvious, but still you completely disregard this fundamental aspect of altruism: compassion. The motivation of every morally virtuous act is to prevent the suffering of others, the good conscience that accompanies such deeds is secondary (and very often does not effectively compensate for the disadvantages the compassionate person accepts in order to alleviate the pain of others). Altruistic behaviour is spontaneous. Think for example of someone drowning, screaming for help. Some will immediately feel the urge to help, jump into the floods and risk their own life in order to save the person. Most people, however, will do nothing or merely call for help while watching the person go down. And, admittedly, in no way it is condemnable not to risk one's life for a stranger. But a few, very few individuals will, spontaneously, do everything to save another human being's life. This kind of selflessness is the most beautiful thing in the world. It has nothing to do with the expectancy of a pleasurable feeling in the aftermath, as you describe it, it is diametrically opposed to that - all that counts is the well-being of another, in the most extreme scenario the altruistic person will try to achieve this at the expense of his own life. For Schopenhauer compassion is the "primal phenomenon of ethics", an empirically ascertainable characteristic of human beings that, in effect, permeates every concept of morality that we have. In so far, compassion is the very foundation of morality but what is the cause of being compassionate in the first place? According to Schopenhauer, this is a metaphysical question as it requires to interpret this particular aspect of human existence in regard to what it actually means. Personally, I find Schopenhauer's answer - compassion is an expression of overcoming individuation, of tearing down the wall between "I" and "You" and recognising the oneness and holiness of every being - more convincing than the gene-related evolutionary explanations offered (so far) for the occurrence of altruistic behaviour.
Last edited:
mixed_biscuits
_________________________
Hmm I don't mind your calling my argument preposterous because you seem to have misinterpreted most of my points.
I do agree with Schopenhauer on compassion, but I chose to ignore the concept for the line I was taking.
The argument was intended to be pretty spare and you have to interpret the terms that I used accordingly: 'disposition' for instance is not meant to be short for 'innate disposition.' Other things: my point was 'symmetrical', behaviour is not biased towards the 'moral', it tends to what is intrinsically 'coherent' (with the 'moral' and 'immoral' in extremis both proposed to offer this coherence).
I don't make any claims as to the probability of becoming wholly virtuous or the opposite or take into account the role of society, beyond assuming that there are external pressures that may lead to one acting against one's acquired inclinations - in either a moral or immoral direction.
I do agree with Schopenhauer on compassion, but I chose to ignore the concept for the line I was taking.
The argument was intended to be pretty spare and you have to interpret the terms that I used accordingly: 'disposition' for instance is not meant to be short for 'innate disposition.' Other things: my point was 'symmetrical', behaviour is not biased towards the 'moral', it tends to what is intrinsically 'coherent' (with the 'moral' and 'immoral' in extremis both proposed to offer this coherence).
I don't make any claims as to the probability of becoming wholly virtuous or the opposite or take into account the role of society, beyond assuming that there are external pressures that may lead to one acting against one's acquired inclinations - in either a moral or immoral direction.
Last edited:
mixed_biscuits
_________________________
Tips for self-control, amongst other interesting things: Your Brain at Work
good vid - thanks for the link
mistersloane
heavy heavy monster sound
Generally I think total lethargy, anxiety about being able to cope, either sleeping alot or wanting to sleep alot or not being able to - either mania or listlessness. Not answering the phone. General symptoms of depression really.