Erisology

sus

Moderator
Alternate title: I hear you all are into neologisms...

Erisology was originally coined by a friend of mine, John Nerst, to try and broker a new field: the study of disagreement. (Name comes from Eris, Greek goddess of discord.) The field combines psychology, rhetoric, logic, field theory, conversational analysis, communication style, etc in order to look at what leads people to disagree. Obviously this is a very timely subject in an era of charged discord; John's done some really interesting analyses of contemporary debates, and come up with some solid concepts along the way. I wanna introduce some of his ideas to the forum.

Signal and the corrective: Discourse is not a set of in-a-vacuum positions people hold. It's a series of rhetorical moves, chess-like, in a conversation whose center is an emphasis, an orientation, a general sensibility. And people speak in response to what they perceive as the pre-existing emphasis, shaping their utterances and views to accomodate—to "counterbalance"—that stance. In John Nerst's words, this emphasis is the "signal," the dominant stance. Crucially, the signal is socially contingent: it is a perception of the (sub)cultural context's assumptions and dominant views that evelop a speaker, and to which he implicitly responds—it is the perceived stance of the addressed audience. We might imagine that a lot of poptimist enthusiasm is trying to combat rockist tendencies, thus its stances aren't neutral but an attempt to "push back on" rockism. Just this morning I read a Rebecca Liu essay about how the critical invocations of "genius" and "once in a generation" aimed at young women like Lena Dunham and Phoebe Waller-Bridge are (in part) a preemptive enthusiasm meant to push against the kind of marginalization women creators have historically seen.

Nerst writes:
It also explains the sort of situation (which happens to me a lot) where you switch sides based on who you’re talking to. If you’re with someone with an opposite signal, you prioritize boosting your own signal and ignore your own corrective that actually agrees with the other person. However, when talking to someone who agrees with your signal you may instead start to argue for your corrective. And if you’re in a social environment where everyone shares your signal and nobody ever mentions a corrective you’ll occasionally be tempted to defend something you don’t actually support (but typically you won’t because people will take it the wrong way).

We can see another example in Bourdieu's discussion of Marx: Living in a post-Marx world, we cannot conceive of a pre-Marx world, Bourdieu writes; the situation he responded to is already gone, and it has vanished in part on account of its writing and publication. Thus every piece of writing, every artwork, is a corrective to a signal long disappeared. Bourdieu:
This explains why writers’ efforts to control the reception of their own works are always partially doomed to failure (one thinks of Marx’s ‘I am not a Marxist’); if only because the very effect of their work may transform the condition of its reception and because they would not have had to write many things they did write and write them as they did— eg. resorting to rhetorical strategies intended to 'twist the stick in the other direction'— if they’d been granted from the outset what they are granted retrospectively.

Decoupling: "the ability to block out context and experiential knowledge and just follow formal rules... the opposite of holistic thinking. It’s the ability to separate, to view things in the abstract, to play devil’s advocate."

Nerst thinks folks in the humanities are natural couplers: poetry is the art of association, baggage, etymology, subtext etc. But a decoupling approach, which is more natural to engineer types, is the ability to hold certain variables constant, to entertain hypotheticals, etc. The different styles clash when they come into contact: see, for instance, the mutual scorn of scientists (or analytics!) and continental philosophers, who represent decouplers and couplers, respectively (see Derrida's "trace," e.g.).
High-decouplers isolate ideas from each other and the surrounding context. This is a necessary practice in science which works by isolating variables, teasing out causality and formalizing and operationalizing claims into carefully delineated hypotheses. Cognitive decoupling is what scientists do.

In the holistic, non-decoupling frame, "implications and associations are an integral part of what it means to put forth an idea, and when you do so you automatically take on responsibility for its genealogy, its history and its implications. Ideas come with history, and some of them with debt."

How this conflict plays out, when styles of discourse collide, is the subject of his post on the Klein-Harris debate.
 

luka

Well-known member
We've addressed it a bit, here and there. Poetix in terms of autism. I'm always talking about it in one way or another.
 

sus

Moderator
I'm gonna add some of my own ideas here—I won't claim too much originality, I'm sure they've been reinvented many times before, but it's good to bring them under the "erisological" umbrella

Chinese whispers effect: The first stage is its misrepresentation of an idea by lesser intellectuals (Saul Bellow: How quickly the visions of genius become the canned goods of intellectuals.). The second stage is its watering down for and by the public.

In F.L. Allen's history of the 1920s, he writes of Freud's influence in America:
Like all revolutions, this one was stimulated by foreign propoganda. It came, however, not from Moscow, but from Vienna. Sigmund Freud had published his first book of psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century, and he and Jung had lectured to American psychologists as early as 1909, but it was not until after the war that the Freudian gospel began to circulate to a marked extent among the American lay public.

Sex, it appeared, was the central and pervasive force which moved mankind. Almost every human motive was attributable to it: if you were patriotic or liked the violin, you were in the grip of sex—in a sublimated form. The first requirement of mental health was to have an uninhibited sex life. If you would be well and happy, you must obey your libido.

But as those familiar with psychoanalysis know, these “lessons” of Freud and Jung have been way distorted through their dissemination. This, as Allen writes, “was the Freudian gospel as it imbedded itself in the American mind after being filtered through the successive minds of interpreters and popularizers and guileless readers and people who had heard guileless readers talk about it.”

In many fields, chains of citations lead to similar distortions. A social psych study maybe gets picked up by interested parties—other social scientists—and further "fitted” to the case they are trying to make. Each time a social science finding is re-appropriated, it is used in a way which is mostly honest but still adaptive—it is nudged, slowly, to some other belief entirely. A concept is formalized by a social scientist in a way pragmatically useful to a specific situation at hand; forty years later, it’s adopted by institutions for use in situations to which it is ill-fitted; this is even done with an awareness that it the formalization is ill-fitting, but a deep deference in our society for formalized, universal knowledge—which the scholar’s original, indexical factoring has masqueraded as—wins out nonetheless.

But the biggest problem is that, when these claims get "inflated" or watered down, they no longer seem serious, or they become a joke, and often even smart people who should know better abandon or steer clear of the thinker entirely. Freud is one example, but this is exactly what happened to the famous "fifty words for snow" anecdote. Those paying attention from home know that this meme, made famous by Kate Bush and a million other cultural types, has been (equally famously) "debunked." But we'll get the full story from Regier, Carstensen, Kemp 2016, “Languages Support Efficient Communication about the Environment“:
Franz Boas observed that certain Eskimo languages have unrelated forms for subtypes of snow (e.g. aput: snow on the ground, qana: falling snow), and thus subdivide the notion of snow more finely than English does [1]. He suggested that such cross-language variation in the grouping of ideas into named categories “must to a certain extent depend upon the chief interests of a people” [1]. Boas’ Eskimo example was repeated by Whorf [2], and was subsequently exaggerated through popularization, leading to grossly inflated claims about the number of words for snow in Eskimo languages. Through this exaggeration and resulting critique [3, 4], the snow example has acquired an air of unseriousness, and it tends to be avoided by many scholars. However, recent work has suggested some empirical support for the original claim prior to its distortion [5], motivating a broader re-examination across languages, and greater theoretical attention.
 

sus

Moderator
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This last one to me is probably an illustration of a "the outgroup is all the same" bias I should write up

"Metal all sounds the same" / "Country all sounds the same" Naw, you just haven't spent enough time in it to noticed the meaningfully different moves, the way people distinguish one another
 
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constant escape

winter withered, warm
Juicy stuff here. Not sure whether to address you as you or as a proxy for your friend, but it seems like you are interested in and driven by similar things - so I'll just go for the former.

The Chinese Whispers concept is cool, and I wonder if this effect takes hold because of a difference in interests. The public want answers, whereas the higher intellects can afford (in terms of both intellectual capacity and leisure (the former largely enabled by the latter)) to sustain higher degrees of uncertainty and abstraction, and thus to identify more problems and/or questions than answers. Arguably both groups want solutions, but the former group will more readily settle for a convincing answer? Seeing as they have other concerns that take precedent over intellectual evaluation?

This puts pressure on the mediating group of intellectuals, who are tasked with formulating the discourse in terms of solutions, solutions that can be implemented?

Your point about people disagreeing not because their core beliefs conflict but because their expressions/articulations of those beliefs conflict - do you think an approach to this is just an emphasis on semantics? People seem to hate semantics - but maybe its just a matter of tone, and not coming across as condescending.
 

sus

Moderator
Yeah I think that's part of it—but it's the public's desire for easy answers, combined with a lack of context about whatever discourse, that lets hucksters sell them simplified versions. But also, often these hucksters think they're legitimately appropriating the source material! Maybe it's a life coach who has been pushing a "grit is everything" ethos and all the sudden there's some legitimation from some social science study, and the life coach just isn't sophisticated enough (and also isn't motivated to be skeptical, if it already supports his opinion) to realize that there are serious constraints on that study's ability to generalize, or to realize that what the author (and their discipline) means by some term (e.g. "death drive" as "engaging in voluntary high-risk behavior") isn't remotely the same thing as what the discipline means by it (e.g. to psychoanalysis, death drive is compulsive repetition, inability to break out of habits and routine).
 

sus

Moderator
and in general, I think there are just natural forces of gravitation

I always say, "People aren't converted by ideas; ideas are converted by people."

Abstract, ambiguous language gets disambiguated through relation to your own experience, that's how you make sense of it—you find a referent to match its reference. So if you've had similarish thoughts or feelings, that Derrida line is gonna scan as describing that thought/feeling, but it might not even be about that!

And also, people have worldviews and ideologies and when something seems like it is in alignment, they appropriate and cite it in defense, and pretty soon the thing has been stretched and pulled and amputated a thousand ways, like the Bed of Procrustes
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
Crucially, the signal is socially contingent
more or less the same idea - if I understand correctly - came up in some thread or another awhile back in relation to the Overton window

rather than a single window of accepted discourse on a given issue that can be moved in one direction or the other along an axis (or multiple axes) it's more like the mean of collected individual Overton windows which themselves are constantly being influenced by interaction with each other. you might also call that mean the "signal" of the discourse around that given issue or set of issues or whatever.

that's also how I understand codeswitching to actually work in practice - not just as binary switching between two (or more) languages or dialects, but as a constant adjusting of language (and non-verbal communication) in response to interdependent social context. language change itself functioning in more or less the same way at the societal level - interdependent change over time around a "signal" which would the most standardized form of a language at a given point in time.
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
people have worldviews and ideologies
and the investment in intellectual, cultural, and/or social capital that goes along with them

related, emotional investment

I ran across this J.S. Mill quote awhile back that neatly sums up stupid online arguments (it was being quoted to that effect)
So long as an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains rather than loses in stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were accepted as a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in argumentative contest, the more persuaded its adherents are that their feelings must have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach

tho it seems like you and your friend are more concerned with why arguments arise the first place than how they get out of hand or failed to be resolved once they have arisen. but also, no one wants to be wrong, like no one wants to be the villain of their own story.
 
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padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
btw citing the poptimist enthusiasm as a preemptive pushback against rockism - which is definitely true

the original serious - for lack of a better term - rock critics i.e. Christgau, Bangs, Marcus, etc - did the same thing

very apparent if you go back and read them in the late 60s thru the early 70s

their position, and their combativeness, is necessitated by the need to validate rock etc as capable of serious art

it's how they developed most of rock criticism's bad ideas, like obsession with authenticity, authorship imparting credibility, etc
 

sus

Moderator
That's a great point, do you have any specific texts or passages in mind where I might track this down? It would be very interesting to try to make that full argument... The constant quest for legitimization... And the tragedy is that these efforts backfire by "pushing too hard"—they take off and get more traction at first, but then slowly people start noticing the scale of the claim isn't quite backed up by the thing itself... a reputation check's been written bigger than the object can cash
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
any specific texts or passages in mind where I might track this down?
not that I can think of, no. you just get a feel for it if you read enough Christgau reviews and the like.

it's as much or more about knowing the historical context

i.e. rocknroll's transformation from bullshit pop for teenagers at the beginning of the 60s to (potentially) Serious Art by the end of the 60s, to the extent that within a few years it became so encumbered by its artistic pretensions there was a huge moment to strip away those very pretensions and get back to the energy and directness of bullshit pop.

the further back the better - I think "serious" rock criticism starts to appear around 67. that's also about when the energy that had been percolating since 65 - VU, Floyd, Jimi, Dead - starts making it onto record, and when the established groups - Beatles, Stones - make the leap from teen idols to serious artists (or Revolver is late 66 but close enough).

@blissblogger would be a good person to ask if he's around these days, he seems unsurprisingly to know music criticism history and inside baseball quite well. the generation of UK critics just before his - Jon Savage, Ian Penman, Paul Morley, etc - was the first to really start breaking away from rockism.
 
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padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
one of the very few music history books I'd ever recommend to anyone is Please Kill Me, an oral history of NY punk and some of its antecedents

it's first couple chapters - about VU, Detroit (Iggy/Stooges and MC5), and [sighs] The Doors, cover that chaotic 2nd half of the 60s well

also a unique period in that the traditional cultural gatekeepers completely lost control for a brief moment in a way that could never happen new

same thing happened to an extent in film, i.e. New Hollywood
 

padraig (u.s.)

a monkey that will go ape
The constant quest for legitimization...
it's an endless problem for popular music

this being Dissensus, one very well-documented example is jungle

i.e. it starts purely functional, anything goes, de facto avant-garde pop music, ends up with Goldie on a reality show about conducting classical music
 
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