How full of rage are you?

[HMGovt’s Glorious Return!]

Yes, i reject occasionalism on the grounds that it sounds more like tedius power politics from the middle East, not the finely balanced intricacies of the cosmos at every scale

 

[thirdform]

Yes, i reject occasionalism on the grounds that it sounds more like tedius power politics from the middle East, not the finely balanced intricacies of the cosmos at every scale

noone cares about how you feel, but the validity of your argument.

 

[HMGovt’s Glorious Return!]

"Do as I say or I'll stone you."
"Think as I say or its the gulag"

Avert!

 

[HMGovt’s Glorious Return!]

"gimme that, I want it, God wills it"
Nah, fuck off

 

[thirdform]

"Do as I say or I'll stone you."
"Think as I say or its the gulag"

Avert!

no great loss to the cosmos if you were sent to a gulag for 50 years and stoned to death afterwards, at this rate.

 

[thirdform]

"gimme that, I want it, God wills it"
Nah, fuck off

I see you've smoked weed again.

enjoy, put on some goa trance.

 

[HMGovt’s Glorious Return!]

Cosmos says otherwise, has been kind so far grateful not grasping.

 

[thirdform]

Cosmos says otherwise, has been kind so far grateful not grasping.

she's a fickle mistress. better not get on her bad side. I fear for your powers of judgment.

 

[HMGovt’s Glorious Return!]

Thank you for helping me work through this and refine my scale-bounded model of free will, and some other nice ideas.

 

[other_life]

fwiw i'm not a 'compatibilist' in the sense of 'believes an arbiting divine will<->human free will and determination by necessary and constraining physical laws are compatible' but i am maybe a deliberate confusionist (ie, deliberately confusing mystical and aufklarung registers)

 

[luka]

biscuits has said many times hes a jewish sausage of romanian extraction. hes not coy.

 

[other_life]

wasn't bro talking about going to baptist services too. And this new age tack
mixed biscuits is also a confusionist, i'm just not charitable enough to call him a 'deliberate confusionist'

 

[thirdform]

fwiw i'm not a 'compatibilist' in the sense of 'believes an arbiting divine will<->human free will and determination by necessary and constraining physical laws are compatible' but i am maybe a deliberate confusionist (ie, deliberately confusing mystical and aufklarung registers)

technically, I'm not an incompatibilist either, I'm only an incompatibilist insofar as this is seen as a valid problem, which it isn't. Incompatibilism like materialism is just a philosophy, just an idea. what exists is to act consciously, not consciousness as such.

 

[thirdform]

biscuits has said many times hes a jewish sausage of romanian extraction. hes not coy.

Well he's the most confused Jew ever, because he sounds like a hindu.

 

[other_life]

sometimes he says stuff like "The pre-beer hominid is considered pre-human" and i'm like Right on

schopenhauer in re spinoza -

"Thus he calls 'God' that which is everywhere called 'the world'; 'justice' that which is everywhere called 'power'; and 'will' that which is everywhere called 'judgement'."

 

[luka]

he grew up in harrow which has a large, flourishing indian community. his father ran a biscuit factory, hence the name.

 

[luka]

he got fed all the broken biscuits from the factory as a child. the taste of a biscuit can still bring a tear to his eye.

 

[other_life]

Well he's the most confused Jew ever, because he sounds like a hindu.

new weimar exhibit c

 

[thirdform]

he grew up in harrow which has a large, flourishing indian community. his father ran a biscuit factory, hence the name.

oh wait is this his music?

 

[mixed_biscuits]

how does free will make sense without a soul?

it is the soul which in a sense is divorced from the physical determinations of corporeal existence, and thus is, according to those who believe in souls, able to make the choice.

It's the difference between what we call the külli will and the jüzzi will in maturidi theology, I.E: the divine will constrains the will of the human to be able to make a choice, even if said choices are ultimately divinely determined.

But if you subtract the soul from this, and I'm not sure how else one can believe in souls without it being the religious understanding of immaterial entities divorced from the world, then all choices are determined by material circumstance, not by divine will. Out of body experiences are irrelevant to this because it's a problem of method.

For instance, if you were to ignite cotton, both you setting it alite and it giving off the smell would be part of the divine will, it would only appear to you as autonomous. now with or without a soul, you could burn your finger with it, but the theory is such that in a cosmology grounded on souls, this is a free choice you make due to an intangible disposition provided to you by a divine creator. For true occasionalists, there is no reason why one can't just put their finger to burning cotton, because assuming it will always hurt is a denial of divine will. things-for-us do not exist in occasionalism, all that exists are what we are illuminated to see as sense impressions, but for a true occasionalist, sense impressions only exist within our mind. hence the idealist-materialist schism.

But without a soul, it's not a free choice, but purely determined, based on calculations one makes.

None of the reports I've read say that God wills everything. Souls are created by God to be largely independent in order to have free will in the first place. Caveat: God is typically reported as the 'all that is', so I guess technically our souls, although differentiated within the all that is, may not have a will that is separate to God's.

Although humans whose soul has gone temporarily walkabout on out of body experiences seem less independent, the fact that the behaviour of so many animate things for which there is much less evidence of souls looks somewhat purposive suggests that either those things e.g. insects, cells, plants also have souls or that material can have will or that everything is made of soul stuff (part of the divine).

Note that materialist physics is no longer wholly determinist as quantum processes have fundamental indeterminacy. This indeterminacy is probably the interface for, or expression of, the pervasive will.