So the argument here is not that gender "is not real" (while biological sex "is real"), but that gendering "realises" sex, fixes its co-ordinates within a gendered reality. Much of the scientific discourse on biological sex is strongly contoured by the discursive limits of the gender system, as Joan Roughgarden has argued quite persuasively.
Heteronormativity reaches "all the way down" into the way we construe how bodies function and what they can do.
I'm reminded of the still somewhat paranoid obsession with a 'homosexual gene' (those 'evolutionary psychologists' again), but no corresponding obsession with a 'heteronormative' gene, or a 'bisexual' gene, or a 'non-sexual' gene, or a 'trans-sexual' gene, or a 'transvestite' gene, with the scientific discourse itself anthropomorphizing 'sex' everywhere.
What I'm trying to indicate is that arguments over whether or not something like race "is real" don't really gain a lot of traction in this kind of situation: and I don't think that saying that some things are more real than others helps very much either - unless one can describe how this variation in intensity of existence is governed, and how it is possible for it to change.
Yes. What 'de-ontologizes' all of this too - whether sex or race - is, ironically, biogenetics itself, because if genetic (re)engineering is able to reduce the human psyche to an object of manipulation ( what someone like Heidegger feared as the 'danger' inherent in modern science and technology), to fundamentally reconfigure and reduce a human being to a natural object whose physical features can be altered, then it is not just humanity which is retrospectively problematized and undermined, but nature itself is lost, is 'denaturalized.' It is not just sex and race, as (voided) master signifiers, that then destitute the discursive consistency of gender and 'skin colour', respectively, but nature itself can longer be invoked as humanism's stabilizing MacGuffin (that 'unfathomable dimension of ourselves' we call 'human nature' goes the way of the present financial meltdown). Those who perceive a basic incompatibility between their biological and psychic-discursive identities can already directly manipulate such a symbolic blockage: for instance undergoing a sex-change if someone believes their gender to be 'trapped' in the wrong sex (not so easy in relation to 'colour', as Michael Jackson's tragic surgery revealed). This reaches its 'discursive limit' when a parent is permitted to 'choose' the sex of her/his child: all becomes merely contingent.
Coming back for a moment to Butler: the general sway of the argument is that gender performativity is the iterative discursive inscription through which a body's sex* is made to appear as coherently organised, the guarantor of the body's integrity. (An unsexed or ambivalently-sexed body is incoherent from the standpoint of the gender system: an object of horror, a hyper-eroticised repository of nasty/nice surprises). There are bodies and languages, and discursive inscription is what naturalises or "ontologises" bodily dispositions, so that sex appears as ontologically stable.
Definitely ...
Microsoft has a new slogan: "
Who do you want to be today?"