APOLOGIES for writing far too much in what follows -- but there's a lot going on in this thread
k-punk said:
Alright, name one serious philosopher who holds to this naive psychological realism. This DOES NOT include your beloved Herr Heidegger, obv, whose whole philosophy is based on denying that complete self-knowledge is possible.
Not sure what you mean by "naive"? Is Hegel an "experienced" psychological realist b/c he preserves Kant and modern science? Or is all phenomenology naive? Or perhaps any philosophy that does not take its bearings from math (philosophy is queen, but math is . . . )?
And even if Heidegger were the only "serious" philosopher to take an approach or position, are you suggesting that truth is a matter of counting votes?
Let me state the issue b/w K-Punk and Bat on the one side, and JE on the other:
(1) Is political action subject to limits?
(2) If so, is it wise (productive) or foolish (counter-productive) to heed or conform to such limits in advance of taking action?
As to the first question, there are four main alternatives:
(1a) political action is subject to limitations attributable to "nature": (i) man's natural ends; or (ii) the passions predominant in most men, e.g., fear of death, love of comfort, love of one's own, greed; or (iii) the actor's own nature & purposes
(1b) political action is subject to the historical situation
(1c) political action is subject to the play of "power," i.e., there is nothing but power and its expression has no laws of its own
(1d) political action is free purposive action and is in no way bound by contingency; its sole criterion is universality b/c its movement occurs in the noumenal realm
As to the second question, the (superficial) solutions are:
(2a) insofar as the actor has knowledge of nature, that knowledge should inform and guide his actions before and during the fact, in some instances counseling caution, and in other instances daring
(2b) here the answer depends on whether history & action are conceived primarily in terms of praxis or poiesis; if poiesis (hegel), then the limit cannot be known until after the fact, which, in combination w/ the subject's extreme alienation from the world, militates in favor of bold or transformative endeavor; if praxis (heidegger), then there is no limit to know as such b/c action has no end outside of itself, which means that its virtue is phronesis/resoluteness, doing the truly proper or originary----in badiou this is fidelity to the axiom that names the event
(2c) here there is no need for measure, but also no argument against measure
(2d) here there is no good answer b/c the noumenal/phenomenal distinction is unworkable
But since I'm not capable at the moment of elaborating on any of the above, I'll refrain from trying . . . .
Instead, I'll re-state and elaborate on what K-Punk, Bat, and JE have already said, and in so doing show the relevance of the scheme I have outlined . . . .
But first, let me briefly address K-Punk's add'l remarks, in order:
k-punk said:
Being a determinist does not mean that you are committed to any view about 'knowledge of limits'. Remember that Spinoza is a philosopher of total metaphysical determination AND a philosopher of Freedom AND the philosopher who says 'no one knows what a body can do'. Rationalists like Leibniz and Spinoza are determinist i.e. Leibniz says that crossing the Rubicon is part of Ceasar's essence but this does not mean that they think that Ceasar or any other human beings could know that in advance of it happening. It just means that there is a sequence of cause and effect that is strictly logically entailed. Leibniz would argue that only God can know what this sequence is, though; we post-Cantorians know that even God cannot know.
Can't say that I've read Leibniz. Am curious to know what he means by Caesar's "essence" -- the essence of his nature (bold, decisive)? or his essence as in the historical purpose he serves (i.e., to bring an end to Republican Rome)?
if the former, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon established his decisive nature - then this is akin to a finite point along an infinite line of causes & effects -- but as Spinoza reasons, the infinite does not consist of finite parts -- the Rubicon cannot be isolated either prospectively or retrospectively -- we are in the region of calculus
if the latter, Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon revealed his historical purpose -- then we have moved into the region of poiesis -- and here we have retrospective knowledge of the limit (Leibniz read through a Hegelian lens)
k-punk said:
The claim that there are limits is not equivalent to the claim that such limits could be known. Insofar as there is knowledge, it is always retrospective.
There are different ways of knowing limits.
Objective knowledge of limits = Hegelian retrospection = reliance on the concept of poiesis
Resolute knowledge of limits = the Heideggerian moment = reliance on the concept of praxis
Rough knowledge of limits = Leibniz's calculation = reliance on the bad infinity
Denial of limits = "everything is possible" before the fact = groundless assertion
k-punk said:
But what, in fact, are these limits? Yes, down with History, down with Nature (except in the Spinozist sense): politics AND cybernetics are predicated on the destruction of these theistic residues. Cyberpunk as the dismantling of everything Possible, all limits, all so-called facticity. All codes (social, genetic, semiotic) are up for grabs.
sounds like empty pomo rhetoric to me (except the Spinozist bit)
the task of philosophy -- to paraphrase badiou -- is to extract "truth" from politics (praxis) and art (poiesis) by judicious use of the matheme