Let’s consider… Since we are talking about Leibniz, what could all this mean? There’s an author who is well known today, an Argentinean, named Borges, an extremely learned author who read widely. He is always talking about two things: the book that does not exist [end of the tape: that should be treated as a book that exists, that is going to be written and told as an existing book, and the labyrinth. He has no trouble showing that they are the same thing, that the non-existent book that exist and the labyrinth are the same. And, I am saying something obvious here: throughout his entire works, Borges is fundamentally and deeply Leibnizian. It’s true in all his writing, but yet again, I take an example that I refer to you because this gives Borges a [modern] aspect, a kind of police tale. He loved police stories, Borges, but so did Leibniz. In
Ficciones, there is a short story, "The Garden of Forking Paths." As I summarize the story, keep in mind the famous dream of the
Theodicy.
"The Garden of Forking Paths," what is it? It's the infinite book, the world of compossibilities. The idea of the Chinese philosopher being involved with the labyrinth is an idea of Leibniz's contemporaries, appearing in mid-17th century. There is a famous text by Malebranche that is a discussion with the Chinese philosopher, with some very odd things in it. Leibniz is fascinated by the Orient, and he often cites Confucius. Borges made a kind of copy that conformed to Leibniz's thought with an essential difference: for Leibniz, all the different worlds that might encompass an Adam sinning in a particular way, an Adam sinning in some other way, or an Adam not sinning at all, he excludes all this infinity of worlds from each other, they are incompossible with each other, such that he conserves a very classical principle of disjunction: it's either this world or some other one. Whereas Borges places all these incompossible series in the same world, allowing a multiplication of effects. Leibniz would never have allowed incompossibles to belong to a single world. Why? I only state our two difficulties: the first one is, what is an infinite analysis, and the second, what is this relationship of incompossibility?
The labyrinth of infinite analysis and the labyrinth of compossibility.
Deleuze insists that to discuss Spinoza, one should understand where Spinoza starts, with the attributes, constituent elements of substance.
deleuze.cla.purdue.edu