global financial crash yay!

IdleRich

IdleRich
"Well, it's not that crazy, is it? If all banks are suffering because they're having to write down the value of their assets in line with panicked valuations and deleveraging fire-sales, and the valuations clearly don't have any relation to the value at maturity... Why not? It's not about making numbers up, or at least, it shoudn't be."
I think I can see both sides of this. Yes, seems unfair that they should take a hit from an unreal valuation - but what valuation would be better? And would it do anything for confidence if banks are just allowed to recalibrate their valuing methods - everyone would know that their fundamental position hadn't changed so I can't see anyone changing their opinion - especially as there would be a lack of trust in the banks to do it in a way that was any more realistic.
I think if there is something like this that needs to be changed it's better to do it at a time when they're not in the middle of a crisis as that necessarily means that it is likely to be rushed and open to abuse.
 

vimothy

yurp
Optimism

Economists: Don't despair, Depression not knocking -- Mary Ellen Podmolik and Mike Hughlett, Chicago Tribune

Wall Street Will Drown Alone -- Casey B. Mulligan:

In order to find good predictors of non-financial sector performance, and GDP growth generally, we look to the non-financial sector itself. One of those predictors is the profitability of non-financial capital, or the “marginal product of capital” as we economists call it. The marginal product of capital after-tax is a measure of how much profit (revenue net of variable costs and taxes) that each unit of capital is producing during, say, the last year. When the marginal product of capital after-tax is above average, subsequent rates of economic growth (and subsequent marginal products of capital) also tend to be above average.

Since World War II, the marginal product of capital after-tax averaged between 7 and 8 percent per year. During 2007 and the first half of 2008 – exactly the time when financial markets had been spooked by oil price spikes and housing price crashes – the marginal product had been over 10 percent per year: far above the historical average. Compare this to the marginal product of capital in 1930-33 (the years of Depression-era bank panics): 0.5 percentage points per year less than the postwar years and significantly less than in 1929. The marginal product of capital was also below average prior to the 1982 recession (in this case, far below average) and prior to the 2001 recession. Thus, the surprise was not that GDP continued to grow 2007-8 despite the bleak outlook from Wall Street’s corner of the world, but that GDP growth failed to be significantly above the average. More important from today’s perspective is that much capital in America continues to be productive, and that this will likely permit Americans to advance their living standards as they have in years past. The non-financial sector today looks nothing like it did in 1930.​
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
From that article.

"It is equally hard to detect a correlation between stock returns, long term bond returns, or commodity returns and subsequent GDP growth. Quite simply, history has shown that the non-financial sector can do well when the financial sector does poorly, and vice versa."
Very interesting. That's an answer to the question I was asking here a couple of days ago

"What are the consequences of low share price except that investors lose money? I guess it can be hard to raise money, it can make the company vulnerable to a take over, it means that investors get annoyed and so it can be destabilising, anything else? Why should I care is what I mean?"
 

DWD

Well-known member
I think if there is something like this that needs to be changed it's better to do it at a time when they're not in the middle of a crisis as that necessarily means that it is likely to be rushed and open to abuse.

I agree with that. Changing the accounting rules now (by shifting to some kind of fundamental measure) will result in a big bounce in the value of banks' illiquid assets - which most people would instinctively dismiss as accounting manipulation.

Rather than changing the way people report value, I think the market should be looking for a way to produce an improvement in asset values within the current reporting system. In other words, someone needs to start buying MBS and CDOs again.

That's why I think the Paulson plan is a good starting-point: as soon as a buyer emerges for this paper, its market value will increase. As its market value increases, banks will start reporting mark-to-market profits. If they're reporting profits they'll find it easier to raise capital - and if they're simultaneously shifting securitised credit from their balance sheets, they'll need less capital anyway, so they'll be able to start putting some of it to work by doing fresh business.

Then, after this is over (*crosses fingers*) they should change the accounting rules. I'd say that assets should still be marked to market - but changes in value should be recognised elsewhere on the financial statement. They shouldn't appear as profits and losses.
 

vimothy

yurp
Then, after this is over (*crosses fingers*) they should change the accounting rules. I'd say that assets should still be marked to market - but changes in value should be recognised elsewhere on the financial statement. They shouldn't appear as profits and losses.

DWD, can you point me at any research or articles or blog posts exploring this?
 

vimothy

yurp
This is by Doug Noland, a die hard free-marketeer and a very clued up observer of current events. Not unlike Roubini and Setser (but from the oppoiste side of the macro-thoery divide), he called this crisis a long time ago and has been watching with a wry grimace as events have unfolded with their own inevitable logic.

From his latest column at Safe Haven. First paragraph kinda says it all -- (And Lehman emerging as some kind of turning point in confidence it seems. Note also some interesting stuff relating to Roubini's plan to affect household debt "overhang" and how household debt can translate financial stress to the real economy):

Changed Financial Landscape:

For our country's sake, I hope our Washington politicians can work out a mindful financial sector bailout package over the weekend. Not that I am pro-bailout or for government intervention. It's just that our financial system is teetering at the precipice. Last night's federal takeover and "sale" of Washington Mutual, our nation's largest bank failure to date, was yet another major body blow. Confidence has now been shaken so brutally that our policymakers can do little to repair the damage. Yet at this point, stop-gap measures to restrain collapse seem more appealing to me than no measures at all.

The Financial Structure that fueled myriad Credit Bubbles, asset Bubbles, economic Bubbles and overliquefied the entire world is today no longer viable. Wall Street finance is at this point an unmitigated bust, with a few of the "holdout" sectors (i.e. the Credit default market and the hedge fund community) now succumbing. The great Financial Alchemy of transforming endless risky loans into perceived safe and liquid "money"-like instruments has run its historic course. And with risky loans - household, financial sector, business, municipal and speculator - having come to play such a prominent role in the nature of spending and "output", the near elimination of risky lending will prove a momentous financial and economic development. The U.S. Bubble economy is today in dire straits.

We've reached the point where it has become difficult to secure new borrowing unless one is of quite sound Credit standing. This is the case for individuals seeking to buy automobiles and homes; to afford myriad discretionary and luxury goods and services; to finance educations; or to make the types of big ticket purchases that had been bolstering our Bubble Economy. Lenders are now moving aggressively to cut home equity and Credit card lines. And, importantly, recent developments have significantly tightened Credit Availability for businesses of all sizes. Securitization markets have been largely shut down for awhile now. Now acute stress has incapacitated the money markets.

Unless some dramatic development reverses the current course, it will not be long before a self-reinforcing cycle of company payroll and spending cutbacks takes hold. At the same time, the municipal bond market is in disarray. The economic impact from major cutbacks in state and local government spending will be significant. Today's finance-related economic headwinds are Cat-4 (and gaining) Hurricane Systemic Credit Seizure, compared to last year's Tropical Storm Subprime. Federal Reserve-dictated interest rates are extremely low - and the Fed and global central bankers have injected unfathomable amounts of liquidity - yet Credit Conditions have turned the tightest they've been in decades.

The Lehman bankruptcy marked a major inflection point in the confidence of contemporary "money." It was a decisive blow against trust in various money market instruments - the very foundation of our monetary system. "Money" has now tightened significantly for virtually all players that had previously enjoyed cheap short-term financings. This list certainly includes the hedge fund community.

The Lehman bankruptcy also marked a major inflection point in confidence for the various "daisy chain" players involved in intermediating risky loans into contemporary "money." The market was convinced Lehman was "too big to fail." Its failure inflicted thousands of market participants with losses - from Primary Reserve Money Fund investors caught with short-term Lehman paper to holders of Lehman's long-term bonds. Investors all over the world were impacted. The hedge fund community suffered mightily. The status of hundreds of billions of derivatives and counterparty obligations was suddenly up in the air or in the hands of the bankruptcy court. And, importantly, huge losses were suffered in the Credit Default Swap marketplace - the marrow of one of history's most spectacular speculative manias.

Trying to add a bit of simplicity to the Complexity of a Credit Market Breakdown, I'll say the Lehman collapse marked a critical inflection point in at least five major respects: First, the Crisis of Confidence jumped the "firebreak" from risk assets to contemporary "money," shattering trust in various facets of contemporary finance that was forged over decades. Second, it required the marketplace to reexamine exposures to various direct and indirect counterparty risks, a terminal blow for derivatives markets. Third, it pushed the Credit default swap marketplace into full-fledged dislocation and instigated a long-overdue regulator onslaught. Fourth, it decisively burst the "leveraged speculating community"/hedge fund Bubble. This has ushered in another round of problematic de-leveraging and accelerated the reversal of "Ponzi Finance" dynamics. Fifth, it instilled global fear with respect to the risks of participating in the inter-bank lending market with American institutions.

Basically, the Lehman collapse marked the end of "Wall Street" risk intermediation as a significant component of system financial intermediation. Going forward, Credit growth will be chiefly generated by the banking system, supported by various forms of government backing (Fed, FDIC, Washington bailouts/recapitalizations, etc.), the government-operated GSEs, and various forms of federal government debt issuance. Importantly, this new financial structure will ensure minimal risky lending as well as significantly reduced risk-taking. And from a global perspective, I believe newfound fears of lending to the American financial sector marks the beginning of the end of our economy's capacity for trading new financial claims for imports of energy and goods.

Over time the Changed Financial Landscape will have a profound impact on the underlying economic structure. Our economy will have no alternative than to get by on less Credit, less risk intermediation, and fewer imports. In the near-term, the effects will be a rapid and pronounced slowdown of our economy's "output." And while we'll only know over time, I'd bet this new financial structure will allocate much less finance to entrepreneurial activities, productive endeavors and the asset markets - while at the same time providing ample (government-directed) purchasing power to ensure stubborn consumer price inflation.​
 

DWD

Well-known member
DWD, can you point me at any research or articles or blog posts exploring this?

Sorry. Most of my info is from bank research, the finance press and conversations, so I'm not going to be much help here.

The one thing that comes to mind is a short article which appeared in the BofE's Financial Stability Report in April. You can find it here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2008/fsrfull0804.pdf

The whole thing is a 6mb pdf but the relevant piece appears on pages 18-20. It compares two ways of estimating total losses on subprime MBS - one based on long-term expectations, and one which uses market values. The difference is pretty stark and this piece raised exebrows when it came out because it was seen as a direct attack on m2m accounting by the Bank.

It doesn't suggest any alternatives to m2m accounting, though, which I think is what you were looking for? I'm sure there'd be some research about this online somewhere. Googling "mark-to-market, alternatives" might turn something up. Sorry to be so lame!
 

vimothy

yurp
Just found this post at Curious Capitalist, a blog by the author of a book on the efficient markets hypothesis: "suspending mark-to-market is for zombies".
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
"Some S&Ls--like Washington Mutual--took advantage of the reprieve to trim down, shape up and get themselves out of trouble."
Oops.
But yeah, I see what he's saying in general. This bit I agree with up to a point

[R]eports that are truthful are more useful than those that are not; reports based on assumptions and predictions are not as reliable as reports based on observations; mark-to-market reports are based on observations; other methods of accounting are based on assumptions or untimely measures of investments (e.g., cost); ergo, MTM accounting is superior to other forms.
But what if there could be some other method of accounting that was based on observations? Not that I'm the person to suggest one.
 
The Earl of Caithness saw this coming, back in 1997

This speech was delivered by the Earl of Caithness in the House of Lords, Wednesday, 5 March, 1997. It is reprinted in full from Hansard, Vol. 578, No. 68, columns 1869-1871.

The Earl of Caithness: My Lords, I too wish to thank my noble friend Lord Prior for initiating this debate. It comes at a most interesting time in the run-up to the general election and, as a result, we could not have envisaged the parties opposite saying anything thought-provoking or interesting about the economy. We were not disappointed.

Looking at it from a conventional viewpoint, the economy is in good shape and the Government have done better than most of their counterparts in Europe. We have moved out of recession and on the surface the economy is stronger and people are more confident. There is much that I could say about that. I think the Government have done a very good job.

However, it is also a good time to stand back, to reassess whether our economy is soundly based. I would contest that it is not, not for the reason to which the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, alluded, which is that it is the Government's fault, but our whole monetary system is utterly dishonest, as it is debt-based. "Dishonest" is a strong word, but a system which by its very actions causes the value of money to decrease is dishonest and has within it its own seeds of destruction. We did not vote for it. It grew upon us gradually but markedly since 1971 when the commodity-based system was abandoned.

Let us look at what has happened since then. The money supply in 1971 was just under £31 billion. At the end of the third quarter of last year, it was about £665 billion. In 25 years it has grown by a staggering 2,145 per cent. Where has the money come from? Interestingly, the Government have only minted a further £20 billion in that time. It is the banks, the building societies and our commercial lenders who have created the balance of £614 billion. If this rate of growth is projected over the next 25 years, the money supply in 2022 will be over £14,000 billion.

All that new money bears interest paid either by us as individuals, by companies or by the Government. Today the Government pay over £30 billion annually in interest charges -- coincidentally about the same as the total money supply only 25 years ago. Governments since then have abdicated their responsibility for producing new money and controlling the money supply so that now they are marginalised. In 1971 government notes and coins accounted for 14 per cent of the money supply. Now it is only about 3.5 per cent. "So what?", noble Lords might ask.

The problem is that it is commercial lending that has boosted the money supply, thus increasing debt and, as sure as night follows day, inflation follows growth in money supply of this sort. The only reason that debasement has not flowed into price figures in the last four years is that the high interest rates in the recession gutted businesses and individuals, leaving too many unable to pay the price levels that the debasement requires. But the wall of money is increasing remorselessly. The noble Lord, Lord Ezra, mentioned the Halifax Building Society's latest surplus of about £3 billion to £5 billion.

Since 1991, in a time of recession, it has increased by 32 per cent and most of that is in the last two years. We must remember that virtually all the increase represents a rise in the burden of debt the economy must carry. The wall of money has already driven the stock market to an all-time high and some are now questioning whether it truly reflects company performances. Recently more money has begun to be channelled into both the residential and commercial property markets. Here I must declare my interest as a residential surveyor in central London who has benefited from that. Our company, Victoria Soames, recorded a hardening of the residential market early last year, followed by a 20 per cent rise in the last six months. That rise is continuing, if not accelerating. Lenders remain aggressive and, very disturbingly, the proportion of borrowing by individuals is moving up.

When the money supply increases, as it is doing, the previously existing money is debased accordingly. Therefore, either wages and salaries must also increase to maintain parity or those who earn wages and salaries will find that they no longer participate in the national economy to the same extent as they did previously. This exacerbates the growing fragmentation of our society, which cannot go on for ever. I am not advocating high wages but I am advocating less debasement and better control of the money supply.

When wage inflation does happen, it will feed through to all parts of the economy. The result, sadly, will be that the Government have to use the only tool they know -- an increase in interest rates. That has happened fairly recently, but it is not the first time that is has happened. We saw it in the 1970s and again in the 1980s. It is a consequence of our debt-based monetary system that it leads inevitably to business and economic cycles.

Conventional wisdom tells us that in order to create new jobs and boost the economy, interest rates have to be reduced. That has happened. People are encouraged to borrow to invest and spend. That has happened. As the continuing flow of new money finds its way into the economy, inflation will follow and up will go interest charges again to reduce the level of borrowing. In order to pay the increasing levels of interest, borrowers will once more have to reduce expenditure in other areas of economic activity. The cycle will continue, but the next time, as before, we will all start deeper in debt and with a burden harder to carry. Personal debt has already increased by nearly 3,000 per cent since 1971. How much more can we take? I hope, for the sake of our economy, without which we cannot finance what we want to see -- a good health service and a good social security system among other things -- we will question this conventional wisdom.

We all want our businesses to succeed, but under the existing system the irony is that the better our banks, building societies and lending institutions do, the more debt is created. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsdown, said that there is little that can be done about debt. No, I do not believe that. There is a different way: it is an equity-based system and one in which those businesses can play a responsible role. The next government must grasp the nettle, accept their responsibility for controlling the money supply and change from our debt-based monetary system. My Lords, will they? If they do not, our monetary system will break us and the sorry legacy we are already leaving our children will be a disaster.

This was a linked to from a comment in Robert Peston's latest blog post 'How to solve the crisis'
 
Last edited:

vimothy

yurp
There's probably a lot that could be said in response to that -- the sort of speech that would go down well at Mises.org -- but I'll just note that since the 1990s there has been little correlation between the money supply growth rate (M2) and inflation (see Ceccheti, Money, Banking and Financial Markets, p.35). This is little suprise if you read the good Earl's remarks with any knowledge of historical rates of inflation in the UK -- for example, 24 years ago, when the money supply was what the government currently pay out in annual interest payments, the rate of inflation was 16 percent!
 
Last edited:

vimothy

yurp
Berkeley profs call for quick economic action

Dissecting the global financial turmoil today, a group of UC Berkeley economists said that the situation is critical and the proposed remedies are inadequate. "Fixing this program is now very urgent," said Barry Eichengreen, professor of economics and political science. "It's time for the Congress and the public to come to their senses and realize there are more important things to say than 'not one red cent of my tax money to those fat cats.' What's at stake here is everyone's employment and prosperity, not simply the bonuses and golden parachutes of bankers."

Will the rescue plan now pending in Congress solve the crisis? "My answer is no," Eichengreen said. "It is best seen as a holding action. We have had a year of holding actions so far where the Federal Reserve has flooded the markets with liquidity and that hasn't solved the problem. The credit markets have shut down. The commercial paper market has imploded; inner bank markets have disapeared; companies are meeting their payrolls by charging their credit cards. ... Maybe TARP (troubled asset rescue plan) gives Treasury the wiggle room to surreptitiously do what is necessary - recapitalize the banking system by paying too much. It would be better to be upfront about what they're doing. I think there will have to be a Plan B."...

"[W]e cannot wait the time it would take for this stuff to work itself out," said John Quigley, an economics professor and interim dean of the School of Public Policy. "It requires prompt government action." He added that the proposal now wending its way through Congress is conspicuously missing a key factor: the chance for struggling homeowners to refinance into long-term fixed-rate mortgages. "This does absolutely nothing for the housing market," he said. "That's needed not for its own sake but to prevent a collapse in demand and consumption."...

The money crunch is particularly perilous because the U.S. economy needs to move 8 million workers out of vanishing jobs such as construction and tourism into new jobs and industries, said Brad DeLong, professor of economics. "Those 8 million jobs can't be created unless the funds flow through financial markets to expanding businesses - and they are not flowing right now," he said. "In the second quarter of 2007, we had $300 billion flow through financial markets to American nonfinancial businesses so they could hire workers and make things. We only had $150 billion, half of that, in the second quarter of 2008. We had even less in the third quarter of 2008. I think we might have zero in the fourth quarter. This is not a good situation to be in."...

Questions from the audience of Berkeley students and professors elicited some of the tartest comments. "Don't call it a bailout or a TARP," said DeLong of Treasury's plan. "I recommend 'seizure.' It should be 'the troubled asset seizure and forced bank nationalization plan.'" The question with the shortest answer also drew the biggest - and most rueful - laugh from the audience. Can a U.S. recession be averted at this point? "No," said DeLong as the rest of the panelists nodded in agreement.​
 

hucks

Your Message Here
Iceland now bankrupt. Can't be arsed with a Kerry Katona joke, so just make your own.

Seriously, though, this is nuts. A whole country, granted not a big one, utterly fucked. My favourite line is

"When everyone was extremely rich in Iceland - you know, last month.."
 
Last edited:

IdleRich

IdleRich
Iceland now bankrupt. Can't be arsed with a Kerry Katona joke, so just make your own.
Seriously, though, this is nuts. A whole country, granted not a big one, utterly fucked. My favourite line is
"When everyone was extremely rich in Iceland - you know, last month.."
Crazy times. What happens next in Iceland?
 

IdleRich

IdleRich
I don't get all this stuff about the bank guarantees. UK is kicking up a fuss because Ireland and now Germany have raised the levels that they will guarantee but it wasn't standardised before was it? I mean they all seemed to offer different levels of protection and no-one seems to complain and no-one batted an eyelid when the UK raised its levels earlier in the year - why is it suddenly wrong when other countries raise theirs? Or am I missing something?
 
Top